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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
I. R. STRINGHAM, J. S. SMITH, J.
D. G.ARDNER, CENTRAL LAND
COl\fP ~~NY, a corporation, UTAH
~IOTOR PARK, a corporation, IVA
PARKIN, E. F. ZEYER, L. 0.
HUNTER, ART J. CARTER,
FRED MUSE, IVY RAE PITMAN, E. A. CHAMBERLIN,
FRANK B. BOWERS, M R S.
DEAN R. DAYNES, MRS. HUGH
\\T. LAW, KENNETH E. SMITH,
GLEN C. BILLS, ALBERT P.
HOLT, LEWIS HUMPHRIES,
GOMER 0. THOMAS, UTAH
·CREDIT CO., a corporation, ·CAPITOL CHEVROLET CO., a corporation, H 0 ME ACCEPTANCE
CORP., a corporation, and JOE
JO·HNSON,

Appellants'
Brief
Case No.
716·2

Ap·pellants,

-vs-

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation,
RJe·spondent.

s·TATEMENT OF FAC.TS
This appeal is from the order of the district court
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dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action (Tr. 32) following the election of appellants to
stand on their complaint upon sustaining of a demurrer thereto. The demurrer (Tr. 26) was based on a failure to state a cause of action o'r state a case for injunctive relief. The order sustaining the demurrer ('Tr. 32)
denied the right to amend the complaint and ordered a
dismissal thereof, thus indicating that the ruling of the
court was for failure to state a cause of action for any
relief whatever. It will therefore he assumed that the
complaint stated grounds for equitable relief but that it
failed to state a cause of action entitling appellants to
any re'lief whatever.
By stipulation and order the complaint was subsequently amended in minor details and the order of the
court was made applicable to the complaint as amended by interlineation (Tr. 31).
Since the appeal is on the judgment roll there is
no transcript of evidence and no statement of the
court's reasons for sustaining the den1urrer of the respondent. The complaint alleges that the action of respondent was taken \vithout evidence, without finding,
without reasonable support, and that it \Vas not promotive of the public health, safety, morals, or we'lfare of
Salt Lake City or its people by alleging that none of
those interests would be promoted by the action of the
respondent.
There follow the complaint as amended, without the
title and verification (Tr. 1), and Exhibits "A", "B'',
and "D" attached to the complaint (Tr. 11, 13, 16). ExSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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3
hibi ts " C" and "E ' ' ('Tr. 13, 17) are not reproduced as
they will be referred to only generally in the argument
herein.

"

For their cause of action plaintiffs allege :

1. Plaintiffs, I. R. Stringham; J. S. Smith; J. D.
Gardner; Central Land ·Company, a corporation; Utah
Motor Park, a corporation; Iva Parkin; E .F. Zeyer; L.
0. Hunter; Art J. Carter; Fred Muse; Ivy Rae Pitman~ E. A. C:Q.amberlin; Frank B. Bowers; Mrs. Dean R.
Daynes ~ Mrs. Hugh W. Law; and Kenneth E. Smith, are
owners or operators of motor courts in Salt Lake City,
Utah, which motor courts offer lodging accommodations
to visitors, to transient persons, and to residents of Salt
Lake City, usually on a daily or weekly basis.
2. Plaintiffs, Glen C. Bills; Albert P. ~olt; Lewis
Humphries; Gomer 0. Thomas; Utah Credit Co., a corporation; Capitol Chevrotet Co., a corporation; Home
Acceptance Corp., a corporation; and Joe Johnson, are
owners or opera tors of service stations or other facilities servicing or relating to motor cars and situated in'
Salt Lake County, Utah.
3. The defendant is a municipal corporation existing under the laws of the State of Utah and situated in
Salt I_jake County, Utah; and corporate plaintiffs are
corporations of the State of Utah.
4. Each of the plaintiffs is the owner of a sign or
signs advertising the business of such plaintiff and inviting patronage of said business from members of the
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public who travel upon and use the streets of Salt Lake
City, and each of said signs is situated upon that portion
of the public streets known as the curbing or parking
area lying and being between the curb or edge of the portion of the street used for vehicular traffic and the sidewalk or th-e portion used for pedestrian traffic, and each
of said signs is mounted upon a support which is affixed to or rests upon said portion of the public street.
None of said signs protrudes over or is above any portion of any public street which is customarily used by
pedestrians for walking, by vehicular traffic for travel
or movement, or by any other group of persons except
these plaintiffs, who care for the lawn, flowers, shrubs~
and trees in said parking areas and service said signs
as and when service is needed.
5. All of the aforementioned signs were constructed
after obtaining, and pursuant to, permits issued by the
defendant upon application of the plaintiffs and pursuant to Section 5720 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake 'City, Utah, 1944, copy of which is marked Exhibit
"A," attached hereto, and by this reference made a part
hereof. Plaintiffs have information which they believe
and therefore allege as the fact that no objections have
been made to the existence of the aforesaid signs for
any reasons of. health, safety, mora:ls, general welfare,
unsightliness, nuisance, or as being contrary to the best
interests of the public residing within Salt Lake City,
and the only objection against said signs which is known
to P'laintiffs is that an official of the Road Commission
of the State of Utah is reported to have said that there
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should be no signs on any state highways in the State of
Utah, ""hich objection would be applicable to a part only
of the signs owned by plaintiffs, namely, to those signs
situated on streets of Salt Lake City which are also designated as state highways. This alleged objection of an
officia:l of the Road Commission would be applicable to
a great number of overhanging signs, marquees, and presumably to obstructions and encroachments on and under
the sidewalks of streets of ,Salt Lake City which are designated as state highways, none of which said signs and
other structures and obstructions are affected by the
revision of Exhibit ''A,'' hereinabove referred to and
none of which defendant is endeavoring to curtail or
prohibit.
6. T"rice during the year 1947 officials of the defendant notified groups of the plaintiffs that signs on
parking or curb areas of the streets of defendant city
should be removed and that permits for a continued use
of said signs would not be renewed.
7. At the request of plaintiffs named in paragraph
1 hereof the Board of Commissioners of defendant gave
notice of a hearing relative to promulgation of an ordinance designed to amend Section 5720 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1944, which notice is attached hereto as Exhibit '' B '' and by this reference
made a part hereof.
8. Pursuant to Exhibit "B," representatives of the
plaintiffs named in paragraph 1 appeared before the said
Board of Commissioners and voiced objections to the
propofoied revision of the ordinance aforesaid for the
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reason that such revision would he discriminatory, contrary to the best interests of the residents of Salt Lake
City, and not pursuant to any of the authority vested
in the Board of Commissioners of defendant. At said
hearing no person appeared in support of the revision
of said ordinance and the said Board of Commissioners
indicated no request from residents of Salt Lake City,
Utah, for such a revision and indicated no reason of
public net~d or policy requiring or permitting the proposed revision of said ordinance, except that said Board
of Commis~Sioners had long considered the advisability
of withdra\ving licenses for signs for such as those
owned by plaintiffs, as aforesaid, and that it would
be a good thing if such a revision were made and said
signs removed, and also that a representative of the
Road Commission of the State of Utah had mentioned
that no signs, including some of the signs of plaintiffs,
should he allo\\red to exist on or over the public highways of the Stat~ of Utah.
9. Despite the objections of these plaintiffs, voiced
as aforesaid, and the lack of any public or private support for a revision of said ordinance in the manner
threatened, the Bonrd of Commissioners of Salt Lake
City has purported to pass and promulgate a revised
ordinance No. 5720 nf Salt I...~ake City, Utah, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and by this
reference made a part hereof.
10. At the hearing aforesaid no evidence \vas given and no reason or authority except as stated hereinbefore for changing signs situated in, on, or over the
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city property from ''structures'' to ''obstructions'' simply by rewording an ordinance, as has been attempted
by the defendant acting by its duly e'lected Board of City
Commissioners.
11. Exhibit '' C '' is beyond and in excess of any
lawful authority vested in the said Board of Commissioners of defen~ant and is discriminatory, unlawful,
unreasonable, and void as being unrelated to any legitimate object of the defendant city, as is more fully
sho'vn by the following facts :
(a) The said signs of plaintiffs are not such ob...
structions as to require p~rohibition or as to permit of
discriminatory prohibition or regulation for the reason
that the said parking areas throughout Salt Lake City
and outside of the congested district are planted with
trees, which trees are much more of an obstruction of
view and an interference with the safe use of streets
than are said signs; the streets of Salt Lake City have
placed in said parking areas numerous uti'lity pole.s,
which said poles are more unsightly and are greater obstructions to the safe use of said streets than are the signs
of plaintiffs; there are over and above the streets of
Salt Lake City, and particularly in the congested portion of said city, numerous overhanging signs and advertisements, some of which are affixed and attached to
buildings and others of which are not, a~d which extend
and protrude over and above the streets of said city,
which said signs are more dangerous to the safe use of
the streets and particularly the side,valks thereof than
are the signs of plaintiffs and which said signs are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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greater obstructions to the free and safe use of said
streets than are the signs of plaintiffs; and none of the
aforesaid uses, structures, and obstructions are prohibited by the ordinances of Salt Lake City, and the aforementioned signs are specifically permitted under Section
5731, shade trees by Section 4315, and poles by Sections
6001, 6002, 6005, and ·6006 of the Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944.
(b) Said signs of plaintiffs do not encroach upon
the use of the streets of Salt Lake City for the reason
that said signs do not extend over any of the traveled
portions of said streets or over any of the portions used
by pedestrjans; and there are many other uses of said
streets which are permitted by Salt Lake City and which
constitute encroachments upon said uses and, more particularly: Innumerable trees; hanging signs, as above
mentioned, and other advertisements ; delivery chutes,
elevators, and receptacles placed in the sidewalks of said
streets at innumerable places and, particularly, in the
congested areas; and portions excavated under the sidewalks in the congested areas and used for business purposes by the abutting owners.
(c) Prohibition of the signs of plaintiffs cannot be
related to traffic control because most of said signs are
in areas where trees have been planted in the parking
areas, and placing the signs back from the street onto
private property would be a greater traffic hazard than
having them where located; furthermore, overhanging
signs permitted throughout Salt Lake City nre equally
distracting and ·because greater in number, are more disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tracting to traffic and are, therefore, a greater danger
and hazard than are the signs of plaintiffs; furthermore,
the regulations and the enforcement policies enacted and
in effect by the defendant permit advertising signs on
utility buses, on delivery trucks, and on sound trucks
and permit the use of sound trucks over and along the
streets of Salt Lake City, all of which attract the attention of drivers of vehicles on the public streets and constitute a greater traffic hazard than do the signs of
these plaintiffs, none of which uses is p·rohibited as is
attempted by the ordinance here in question.
(d) The said ordinance is unreasonable as a safety
regulation since the signs of these plaintiffs are soundly
constructed of non-combustible materials, are not above
the traveled portions of the streets or sidewalks and are,
therefore, less dangerous to the traveling and walking
public and less dangerous as a fire hazard than are the
permitted overhead signs, -utility wires, guy wires, trees,
and the above-mentioned delivery chutes, elevators, receptaeles, and similar obstructions and encroachments
placed in the sidewalks.
(e) Said regulation is not reasonable as motivated
by aesthetic considerations because said signs of plaintiffs are attractive and well-kept and are not less attractive than are other signs p-ermitted to be over the
stre-ets by said defendant and are more attractive than
uses permitted by private property owners, including the
display of unattractive signs and the construction and
n1aintenance of barns, sheds, garages, and commercial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plants in the areas where the s1gns of plaintiffs are
maintained.
(f) Said regulation is unrelated to health of the
·people of 'Salt Lake City, there being nothing injurious,
noxious, or deieterious about the signs of plaintiffs.
(g) Said signs of plaintiffs are not fire hazards
and are not susceptible to regulation as fire hazards for
the reason that s::tid signs are not in sufficiently close
proximity to buildings or residences, and for the further
reason that said signs are made of non-combustible materials of good construction with a low voltage of electricity, for the further reason that said signs meet all of
the requirements of said defendant for electrical construction and are therefore not a fire hazard or otherwise dangerous.
(h) Said signs of plaintiffs are unrelated to the
morals of Sa'lt Lake City and are not injurious to morals
because the copy on said signs advertiRP.S motor court:;;
and automobile services or automobiles in a clean, whole-·
some, business-like manner.
( i) Regulations of said signs is not justified because of congestion in Salt Lake City for the reason
that most of said signs are located outside the busines~
or congested area, in which area innumerable hanging
signs and other advertising structures are permitted by
the defendant.
(j) Regulation of said signs is not supportable as
an interference with residential uses of the property in
Salt Lake City for the reasons that said ordinance makes
no effort to regulate use of the abutting property, there
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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have been no complaints of the signs of plaintiffs because of such interference, and because some of said
signs exist in commercial and business districts as well
as in residential districts; and said ordinance makes no
reference to use of the property abutting the signs.
12. This action is brought in behalf of all persons
situated similarly to . plaintiffs or any of them, which
persons may join as plaintiffs in this cause or have the
benefit of this proceeding without joining.
13. Plaintiffs have constructed the aforesaid signs
pursuant to permission of defendant at great expense.
1-±. Defendant has given notice to plaintiffs and to
all of them that their existing signs must be removed
on or before February 15, 1948, and that unless so removed the defendant will take action against each plaintiff for removal of said signs.
15. Permitting the maintenance of this action and
issuance of an injunction against the defendant's enforcing said revised ordinance witl avoid a multiplicity
of suits.
16. Unless an injunction issues against defendant's
enforcing Revised Ordinance, marked Exhibit '' C,''
plaintiffs will suffer great and irreparable injury in that
if the signs of the plaintiffs are removed defendant will
not permit their replacement and these plaintiffs have
no remedy by law to compel defendant to permit the reerection of said signs should they be taken down and
new and original application be made for a permit under
a discretionary ordinance.
17. Plaintiffs have offered to pay the annual liSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cense fees for 1948 required for the continued existence
of said signs, which fees defendant has refused to accept
solely upon the ground that the revised ordinance does
not permit continued existence of said signs and not for
any reason of hazard, obstruction of traffic, encroachment upon property of the city, lack of beauty or attractiveness, or acceptability of the copy on said signs
or the appearance thereof, or for failure to maintain said
signs in a safe and adequate manner, and plaintiffs further allege that none of said potential objections exists
as to any of said signs.
18. The Deputy City Recorder of defendant has
furnished information which plaintiffs believe and therefore allege as the fact that the latest official finding,
order, or action taken by defendant with reference to
Exhibit '' C'' and the ordered removal of plaintiffs'
signs, was taken on January 6, 1948, as shown by the
document on file in the City Recorder's office, of which
a copy is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and by this
reference made a· part hereof; and plaintiffs further
allege that the said amended Ordinance 5720, referred
to as Exhibit '' C, '' has not been duly and officially signed or published by defendant's officers and that the
threatened action of defendant above referred to is for
this further reason arbitrary, discriminatory, unr~ason
ahle, and void.
19. Plaintiffs further allege that, should this Honorable Court find that Exhibit '' C'' has not been enacted by defendant and that the action of defendant referred to in paragraph 14 is taken pursuant to Ordinance
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5720 referred to as Exhibit "A," then plaintiffs allege
that said action is unlawful, discriminatory, unreasonable, and void for ali of the reasons alleged in paragraphs 11 and 18 and for the additional reason that subsection •· g" of said Exhibit "A" is unlawful, unreasonable, discriminatory, and void and does not contain
or indicate any standard or standards to govern the removal of structures erected pursuant to permission contained in said Section 5720 permitting defendant to act
arbitrarily and capriciously as defendant is doing in the
matters alleged herein, thereby damaging and threatening to damage plaintiffs as aforesaid and discriminating against plaintiffs. in resp·ect to their signs referred to herein as against other signs and other structures
erected above, over, in, or around any part of any
street of Salt Lake City pursuant to Section 5731, Revised O-rdinances of Salt Lake ·City, Utah, 1944, copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit '' E'' and incorporated herein, which section does not provide for arbitrary
or discriminatory r-emoval unless and until said signs
sha'll become unsafe or dangerous, and defendant has·
made no finding, order, or determination in the premises except as shown by Exhibit ''D.''
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this court issue
a restraining order against the defendant and its officers, agents. employees, and attorneys restraining it and
them from enforcing. Revised Ordinance 5720, attached
to this complaint as Exhibit '' C,'' and that this court
issue an order to defendant to show cause on a day certain ,vhy an injunction should not issue against the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendant and its officers, agents, employees, and attorneys enjoining the enforcement of said ordinance pending final determination of this proceeding by this court,
and that a bond be fixed in such form and amount as to
indemnify defendant against damage from said injunction;
And plaintiffs pray further for a permanent injunction against the defendant enjoining the enforcement of
said Revised Ordinance '5720, for such further relief as
shall he appropriate to protect and preserve the rights
and p;roperty of plaintiffs, and for their costs incurred
herein.
(Signed) RICHARD·S AND BIRD,

Attorneys fo-r PZamtiffs."

"

Exhibit ''A''

SE:C. 5720. Obstructions. Permits. Fees. The following words when used in this ordinance shall have the
meanings respectively ascribed to them:
(a) "S TREE·T. "- All parts of a public
street between the boundary lines, including parkings, sidewalks, gutters, and roadways.
(b) "OBSTRUCTION." Any rub his h,
glass, material, wood, ashes, tacks, metal, earth,
stone or other object, thing or substance which
may interfere _with or obstruct the free use or
view of the street by travelers, or injure or tend
to injure or destroy or render unsightly the surface of a street, or which may cause or tend to
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c.ause such street to become unsafe or dangerous
for travelers thereon.
(c) ~~STRUCTURE.'' Any sign, sign post,
advertisen1ent, merchandise, material, flag, banner, rack, fence, vehicle, object or structure 'vhich
shall be erected, located, deposited or placed in or
upon any street, except those objects affixed to
any building and extending over a street which
are licensed or regulated under Section 5731 of
the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah,
1944.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to
-place, cast, deposit, permit or suffer to remain in
or upon any street in Salt Lake City any obstruction as herein defined.
(e) It shall be unlawful for any person to
erect or place upon any street or to suffer or permit to remain on any street any structure as herein defined without first obtaining from the Board
of Commissioners of Salt Lake City permission
so to do, and then only in strict accordance with
the tern1s and conditions of the express p·ermission granted. The Board of Commissioners of
said city may grant or deny such permission or
imposed additional conditions wmen it deems it to
the best interests of said city in regulating the
use of its streets and may when it deems it necessary require that a surety bond in any reasonable amount BE POSTED AND MAINTAINED. The sum of $25.00 shall be charged and collected annually from every person to whom such
permission is granted, to cover the cost of the
regulation and inspection of any structures erected or maintained in any street.
(f) Every application for permission to
place a structure upon any street in said city
shall be accompanied by the fee required for one
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year, together with plans and specifications of
the same, and shall state the name and address of
the appticant, the place proposed to erect such
structure, the length of time it is proposed to
maintain the same and such other information as
the Board of Commissioners may require.
(g) All permits granted by Salt Lake City
may be revoked, altered, or modified by said city
at the will of the Board of Commissioners thereof
whenever said b-o,ard shall deem it t:o be to the
best interests of such city, and it shall he unlaw
ful for any person to fail to comply with any
order or condition imposed by said city. Every
structure or obstruction maintained upon any
street of said city in violation of this section is
hereby declared to be a nuisance and it shaU be
the duty of the police department and such other
officers and employees of said city as said department may call upon to forthwith remove the
same.
4

Litter in streets. 15-8-24, U.C.A. 1943.
Garbage in streets. 15-8-23, 61, U.C.A. 1943.
Offensive liquid or refuse in streets. Sec. 1123 ''

"

Exhibit '' B''
NO·TICE OF HEARING

NO:TICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on
Thursday, December 18th, 1947, at 11 o'clock a.
m., in Room 302 City and County Building, a public hearing will be held before the Board of Commissioners on request of J. E. Christie and others
on proposed ordinance amending or concerning
Section 5720 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, Utah, 1944, 'vhich by its ter1ns prohibit
signs of motor lodge operators upon ·City properSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ty, or in any manner affect the use of said signs .
. A.ll persons interested and present at said
meeting will be given an opportunity to be heard
in this matter.
By order of the Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, Utah, November 25th, 1947.
IRMA F. BITNER,
City Recorder.
First Publication December 3d, 1947.
Last Publication December 5th, 1947.

"

''Exhibit ''·D''

"

Salt Lake City, Utah, Jan. 6, 1948.
I move that Petition No. 1079 of '47 of J. E.
Christie, et al., be filed and petitioner notified
that the Bureau of Mechanical Inspection has
been instructed to notify all owners of advertising signs and other obstructions now in City
parking, to remove them immediately and that
suitable action be taken to make the amendment
to the City ordinance effective.
EARL J. GLADE
Chairman Committee of the Whole.
RQL.L CALL
AYE
Voting
Affleck
Matheson
Romney
Tedesco
Mr. Chairman

NAY

X
X
X
X
X
X
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Passed by the Board of Commissioners of
Salt Lake City, Utah, Jan. 6, 1948.
IRMA F. BI'TNER,
City Recorder.
EARL J. GLADE,

"

Mayor.
STATEMEN'T OF APPELLANTS' ·CASE
·S'tatutes of the State of Utah (15-8-11, 23, 26, U.C.
A., 1943) delegate to cities control over the streets within their territorial 'limits, authorizing the cities either
to regulate or prohibit use of the streets and sidewalks
for signs and signposts or for obstructions and encroachments. Since Section 15-8-26 refers specin~:1lln to
signs and signposts, that is presumably the section under
which this case falls, although Exhibit "A" indicates
an effort of the city to regulate curb signs under Section
15-8-11 as an obstruction or an encroachment. In either
event, the authority is to regulate or prohibit.
Appellants concede that the respondent could prohibit the placing of any sign on or over the streets and
sidewalks of Salt Lake ·City. Appellants concede that
respondent could order the removal of present signs and
thereafter .prohibit the placing of any and all signs on
or over the streets and sidewalks of Salt I_jake City. But
if some signs are to be a1lowed to remain it. is the position of appellants that the line of distinction between the
signs to remain and signs to be removed must be ·reasonable, based upon regulation which is reasonable and
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based on a classification designed to p·romote interests
of Salt Lake City· as to which the Board of Commissioners has authority. This is the ultimate question appellants sought to raise in the district court on ·the merits
of their case. The ruling on the demurrer necessarily
holds that regardless of the evidence in support of appellants' allegations the action of the respondent is not
revie"\\~a ble or open to question .
. .A.ntecedent to the ultimate question of the city's
authority appellants present certain procedural problems which the respondent should have met before compelling the appellants to resort to legal action and which
should now be met by this court before the ultimate question of the city's authority need be examined.
Appellants contend that the action intended by the
Board of Commissioners of respondent (hereinafter called Commissioners) was an amendment of Exhibit ''A''
to the complaint which would have made all curb signs
obstructions and automatically have compelled their removal and that the direction contained in Exhibit ''D''
to remove signs was premature until the ordinance was
amended and was solely in anticipation of that amendment which was never completed. Appelllants further contend that the language of the ordinance which is Exhibit
''A'' contemplates a determination or finding by the
respondent before any sign is ordered removed, which
is entirely lacking in this case. Beyo_nd that, and assuming that no finding or determination must be made or
evidence taken before ordering a removal, there is still
the right to show that the ordered removal is arbitrary,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

capricious, and discriminatory, which right appellants
have been denied by the order sustaining the demurrer.
And finally, appellants contend that the ordinance which
is Exhibit ''A'' is void insofar as its provisions for the
removal of a sign are concerned because it contains no
standard or rule to guide the respondent or members of
the public, such as appellants, and therefore permits arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory action by the
Commissioners without restraint or right of review or
obligation of consistency.
'This argument is advanced under four points.
POINTS OF APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT
I. No present order of the respondent requires that
appellants remove their signs.
II. Assuming that respondent made an order, then
because the order was made without a finding or determination and in the absence of evidence of reason or
need the order was void and cannot be deemed to be in
the best interest of Salt Lake ·City.
III. Assuming that no finding, determination, or
consideration of evidence must precede is~uance of an
order of remov~l, then th·e order is still arbitrary, capricious, and void because not support8d by any reason,
logic, lawful classification, or legitimate objective.
IV. Section 5720, Revised Ordinance~ of Salt Lake
City, 1944, is void because it contains no standard or
rule to guide the Commissioners or the public in the
matter of removal of licensed signs.
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I. NO PRESENT ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT
REQUIRES TH~L\.T APPELLANTS REMOVE
THEIR SIGNS.
Paragraph 18 of the comp'laint alleges that the latest official action taken by the respondent with reference
to the matters involved in this action was taken on January 6, 1948, "~hen the resolution attached as Exhibit
''D'' was made. This resolution plainly contemplates
that the removal of the signs is to be concomitant with
the effectiveness of the amended ordinance, which is alleged as Exhibit ''C.'' ·There is no authorization for the
removal of the signs apart from the amendment of the
ordinance and no intimation that the action of removal
was to be taken independently of the amendment.
This conclusion is borne out by Exhibit ''B,'' which
is a notice of hearing on the proposed ordinance to
amend Section 5720 of the Revised O-rdinances. And according to the allegations of the complaint no other action was before the Commissioners and there was no
basis for any action independent of the amendment of
the ordinance.
It therefore appears that until the amended ordinance has been passed appellants are not required by the
respondent to move their signs. If and when an order to
that effect has been authorized by the respondent will
be time enough to consider the validity of the action.
It must be borne in mind that Exhibit "D'' directed
the Bureau of Mechanical Inspection to notify all owners of "advertising signs and other obstructions now in
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city parking" to remove them. Under the original Section 5720 (Exhibit "A") an advertising sign was not
an ''obstruction'' but a ''structure'' under Subsection
(c) and it would he grammatically and logically incorrect
for the Commissioners to refer in Exhibit '' D'' to ''advertising signs and other obstructions. ' ' That language
becomes apt only on the assumption that the amended
~ection 57·20 was to be placed in effect since under that
amendment, which is Exhibit "C,'' advertising signs
such as those involved in this suit were made "obstructions." Plainly, the intent was to amend the ordinance
and then remove signs which would have become ''obstructions.''
II.

ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT MADE AN
ORDER, THEN BE'CAUSE THE ORDER WAS
MADE WITHOUT A FINDING OR DE'TERMIN-_
ATION AND IN ·THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE
OF REASON OR NEED THE OR.DER WAS
VOID AND CANNOT BE DEEMED TO BE IN
THE BEST INTEREST OF SALT LAKE CITY.

The argument under this point assumes that the
respondent intended the order for removal of the signs
to be put into effect quite apart from and independently
of the action amending the ordinance. This assumes that
the order was made pursuant to Exhibit "A," the original Section 5720.
The order, therefore, would be under Subsection (g)
of Exhibit ''A,'' which contemplates revocation of per-
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mits issued to such persons as ap·plican ts ''at the will
of the Board of Commissioners thereof whenever said
board shall deem it to be to the best interest of such
city ••****." If this language permits the Commissioners to revoke a license without reason and ''at will''
then it permits arbitrary and capricious action, which
is considered under point III of this argument.
Appellants suggest, however, that the words ''whenever the Commissioners sha:ll deem it to be to the best
interest of such city'' contemplate action which is not
arbitrary and capricious but which is reasonably believed by the Commissioners to be in the city's best interest. To permit the five of them to act, th·e will of the
Commissioners must be . expressed, which ~expression
must indicate that the Commissioners find their action
to be in the best interest of the city, and by making such
.a finding or determination the Commissioners will have
"deemed" the action to be in the city's interest.
This verb ''deem'' could conceivably refer to an unexpressed and inarticulate will of the Commissioners;
but this is not likely since the Commissioners must act
by resolutions either oral or written, and there is no way
of determining the will of the Commissioners uniess that
will is expressed. It must therefore he that the board
''shall deem'' a certain thing only when they have indicated by their official action that they have "deemed"
it. The official action of the board in this instance (Exhibit '' D' ') indicates no intention whatever to further the best interest of the city and there is no indication that the best interest of the city was ever consider-
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ed. If the order recited that the \Commissioners ''deem it
to be in the best interest of the city,'' that order might
be presumed to stand in the absence of proof of capricious action. In Jackson v. James, 97 Utah 41, 46, 89 Pac.
2d 23'5, the court considered the meaning of the phrase
"shall be deemed" and held that it is not intended to
be mandatory or conclusive when it appears in a legislative enactment but procedural or evidential and subject to being overcome by contrary evidence. And if used
in this sense, if the board had deemed the order to be in
the best interest of the city 1Jy stating that they so regarded it, the question would arise which was presented
in Jackson v. James and as to which l\1r. Justice Wolfe
dissented and stated that "deem" in that statute should
be regarded as foreclosing the matter. As applied to this
case, Jackson v. James would permit a review of the
determination of the Board of ·Commissioners under the
majority opinion but not under the dissenting opinion.
~This vie-\v is consistent with definition of the word
"deem" in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary as follows:
Deem - verb transitive.
1.

To sit in judgment over or upon; to
judge ; also, to pronounce judgment upon;
to decide (a case) or give (sentence) ;
sometimes, specif., to judge adversely;
2. To conclude or believe on consideration;
to form a judgment upon; to hold in opinion; to regard; esteem; think.
3, 4, 5, Not useful.
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In the interest of reasonable, orderly government
this court should interpret the language of Subsection
(g) of Exhibit " ..:\.' · to require the Commissioners to
make a determination that certain action is in the best
interest of the city. It is not asking much to require
that a board go on record that the~~ have deemed certain
action to be to the best interest of a city and not permit them to take the position, when their own failure
to make a record is brought before a court, that in the
backs of their minds the ·Commissioners at all times had
the best interest of the city as a guiding light and that
it must therefore be assumed that in taking certain action they deemed the action to further such interest. If
the board deems it to be in the best interest of the city
they should so say, either by using the word ''deem'' or
by making a determination or a finding or a statement
that certain action is in the "best interest of the city.
III.

ASSU~1ING

THAT NO FINDING, DETERMINATION, OR CON'SIDERXTION OF EVIDENCE
MUST PRECEDE ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER
OF REMO\lAL, THEN THE O·RDER IS A~;BI
TRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND VOID BE·CAUSE
NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY REASON, LOGIC,
LAWFUL CLASSIFICATION, OR · LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVE.

Under this point appellants, for the sake of argument, make further concessions that Subsection (g) of
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missioners express anything with reference to the best
interests of Salt Lake ·City but that all they need to do
is think it, and although there is no way of determining
their thoughts except from their expressions, we will
assume that in this case the Commissioners had the best
interest of the city in mind. Appellants respectfully urge
that even on this assumption the Board of Commissioners is not entitled to act arbitrarily and capriciously and
that their action must be reasonable and have some relation to a legitimate objective to he accomplished. In other
words, we take the position of Jackson v. James that
even though the city fathers have deemed something to
be in the best interests of the city the matter is not concluded by such ''deeming'' and, if it appears plain from
an examination of the surrounding facts that the action
was not in the best interests of the city, then the effect
of the word ''deem'' will have been overcome and the
action of the Commissioners will have become reversible
on revie"\v.
'The complaint alleges that no logical reason, basis,
or objective exists which would make the action of the
respondent through its Board of Commissioners supportable; and attempt has ·been made to consider this
action from the standpoint of all possible legitimate objectives. If any of those successive points of view motivated the action then it was ill-conceived, ineffective
to accomplish the objective, and therefore unreasonable
and arbitrary.
Perhaps the court can think up a reason or an objective whieh would support the action of the CommisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sioners. Appellants allege that no such reason exists and
further allege that 'vhen the Board of Commissioners
was asked to state a reason (paragraph 8 of the complaint)) the Commissioners indicated only that they had
long considered the advisability of revoking the licenses
dand that it "1'ould be a good thing" and, also, that a
representative of the Road Commission of Utah had
mentioned that no signs should be allowed to exist over
public high,vays. It hardly seems a reason to suggest
that something '',vould be a good thing'' and even though
it be admitted that "good" is positive and should be
encouraged, it hardly seems a sufficient answer to a
body of taxpayers and citizens which is asking its
government to support intended action by reason. And
the other answer given in paragraph 8 of the complaint
is wholly insufficient because it appears in paragraph 5
of the complaint that the proposed action of the city
fathers was ill-adapted and wholly inadequate to carry
out such direction from the Road Commission of the
State of Utah.
It may be conceded that appellants do not have
what could properly be called a property interest in the
location of their signs. It is conceded that under Sections
15-8-11, 23, 26, U.C.A., 1943, the right to regulate the
portion of the streets where appellants' signs are located has been vested in the municipal authorities. Appellants submit that the same right of regulation exists
as to signs, awnings, trees, marquees, advertising on
buses, trucks, and private cars and that regulatory action
of a municipality with reference to these things cannot
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be arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported or unsupportable by reason. Various courts in a number of cases have
passed upon comparable problems and have held that
the position of a licensee is not completely devoid of
right, that the city's authority in such matters is not
abso·lute, and that a citizen and licensee or prospective
licensee has 'the right to require that his municipal legislative body act reasonably in such matters.
City of Portland v. Yates ( 1921) 199 Pac. 18'4, 186,
187, 102 Ore. 513, was a criminal case for violation of a
municipal ordinance. The defendant had erected a sign
on the street pursuant to a permit, which sign was secure and did not interfere with the use of the street or
the sidewalk. The city amended the ordinance, making
minor changes with which defendant's sign did not comply, whereupon the prosecution resulted when the defendant refused to take down his sign. It was held that
the city was not damaged and that no public need for
taking the sign down was 1nade to appear and that the
amended ordinance as applied to defendant's sign was
invalid.
"The sign in question in the present case,
having been erect.ed pursuant to a permit issued
by the municipal authorities, was not il'legal or a
nuisance. The question for consideration is whether or not the change required by the new ordinance, prescribing the size and specifications
for such a sign, tended to promote the public
health, safety, morals, or welfare. The new ordinance requires a few inches difference in the size
of the sign, a slight difference in the height from
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
the sidewalk, and a change in the style. It is
sho'vn by the testimony that the sign in question
was securely hung. It has been inspected annually. It in no way caused inconvenience to the
public, and did not interfere with the personal or
property rights of any person. It cannot be conceiYed that a sign in conformity with the new ordinance 'vould tend to promote the health of the
inhabitants of the city any more than the old one.
The safety of the public is not claimed to be in
any \Yay impaired by the sign as now constructed,
and the new arrangements would not tend toward
safety. It cannot be claimed that the new requirement is in the interest of the morals or general
welfare of the public. It is not shown and cannot
be comprehended that there has been any material
change in the conditions and surroundings of the
sign since its erection. While the cost of the sign,
$350, was not great, it having been installed pursuant to a regular law of the city, the ru1e adopted
at the time of its erection became, in a sense,
a rule of property, and without some reasonable
cause for the condemnation of the structure it
should not be held to be unlawful.
"Every intendment should be made in favor
of the validity of a municipal law, passed to promote the public welfare. Yet when it is shown that
there is no reasonable basis for the adoption of
the amendatory ordinance, and that the enforcement of the ordinance in the Inanner attempted
in the present case would be, in effect, a deprivation of property unnecessarily and illegally, the
court should so construe the enactment as to prevent a wrongful destruction of property. The ordinance shouid be upheld and enforced as far as
it is reasonable, and not to the unreasonable encroachment of private rights or property. As to
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the sign in question, which was already erected
when the city law was enacted, and is in perfect
condition, the ordinance is in the nature of an ex
post facto law. It tends to impair the obligation
of a contract. The sign in question was not unlawful a.t the time it was erected. It has not been
made so by any valid enactment of the legislative
department of the city."
In Pickrell v. Carlisle, 135 Ky. 128, 131, 121 S. W.
1029, the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the
town from interfering with the placing of steps in front
of his house which woulld encroach upon the sidewalk
at that point. The court of appeals reversed the trial
court and held that the injunction should issue because
the encroachment was not unreasonable in view of all
circumstances, saying:
"It is old and familiar law that the streets,
including the pavements of ·a to,vn, belong to the
municipality for the use of the public traveling
upon them for their \vhole length and width; likewise, that any per1nanent structure built upon any
part of the public streets so far as to interfere
with their use by the public for travel may be per
se a nuisance, and n1ay be abated by the n1unicipality, or be abated by the courts at the instance
of the town. But it is not true that the municipality and the traveling public have the right to the
exclusive use of the public streets. The owners of
abutting lots have rights in the streets in addition to those enjoyed by the general public, and
it may be in spite of their rig-hts, for example,
the abutting owner has a particular easernent in
the street in1mediately fronting his lot, or leading
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
to it, of ingress or egress, to a not unreasonable
extent, a·lthough the exercise of his right might
interfere \Yith the public use. If it were not so,
then to"~ns could not exist, for the title to the
street would in effect, or could, absorb the value
of the abutting lot as a city lot. This right of ingress and egress must be exercised in a reasonable 1nanner, so as to interfere not excessively
\Yith the public right of travel.******* 'The dominant idea of the common law is ''reasonableness.'' Neither the city nor the abutting lot owner
is allowed to act the dog in the manger-at least
there \Yill be given the aid of a court of equity
in so acting. It is therefore that a lot owner is
confined to a reasonable use of his right of ingress, and egress, of ornamentation of his lot and
the street in front of it (as by planting and maintaining shade trees, awnings, lamp posts, and the
like), and the city and public will not be heard in
equity to complain of the abutting owner's act
\vhich does not unreasonably interfere with the
public's use of the street for travel."
Chicago Park District v. Canfield (1943), 382 Iii.
218, 223, 224, 47 N. E. 2d 61, involved an ordinance of
the City of Chicago which provided that no person shall
operate any vehicle, display any placard notice or advertisement in any park or on any public way within the
park district. There were then five specific exceptions,
the fifth of which \\ras the basis of holding the ordinance
invalid.
•'By the fifth exception it is provided that
the ordinance shall not apply to common carriers
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tion, viz : Does not the exception of common carriers and taxicabs from the operation of the ordinance render it invalid~ In determining this
question we must keep in mind that a regulation
of this kind can be sustained, only if it promotes
and protects the public welfare and has a definite reiation thereto. It must contain some element
connected with t-he safety of traffic. It can be sustained only on the ground that it promotes the
safety of public travel and the use of the park and
'park system. Such advertising can only be prohibited on the ground that it tends to distract the
attention of drivers, or others, in such manner
and to the extent that it slows up or congests traffic or increases traffic hazards.****** The Park
District has been expressly authorized to enact
traffic regulations in the parks and on the boulevards under its jurisdiction. This power is subject only to the limitation that such power must
be exercised for the promotion of public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare, in accordance
with the purposes for which the Park District is
organized. If a regulation falls within this classification it is no objection to its validity that it
may also promote aesthetic purposes if its reasonableness niay be sus~ained on other grounds.
N eef v. ·City of Springfield, 380 Ill. 275.
"It is apparent, however, that the ordinance
here involved creates an unlawful classification,
discriminatory in its nature, which renders the
ordinance invalid. The fifth exception provides
in substance that the regulation shall not apply
to common carriers and taxicabs. There is no reasonable ground upon which this classification can
be made. It bears no relation to the object and
purposes of the ordinance.''
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French v. Cooper (1945 ), 133 N. J. L. 246, 34 Atl.
880. The plaintiff applied for a building permit to construct an awning which was refused under a section of
the zoning ordinance of Ocean ·City prohibiting metal,
wood, or cloth awnings extending more than five feet
from any main building wall or less than seven feet
above the sidewalk and prohibiting support from or by
any post, fixture or device resting on or attached to any
street or board walk. The court held the ordinance invalid and that plaintiff was entitled to his permit, sayIng:
''It is settled that a municipality has no
po,ver to limit the use to which property may be
put unless the regulation is designed to promote
public health, safety and general welfare. Durkin
Lumber Company v. Fitzsimmons, 196 N. J. L.
183. \\T e fail to see in what respect the erection
of this a\vning can adversely affect public health,
safety or general welfare. The absence of a brief
on behalf of respondent suggests that they, ton,
experience the same quandry. The fact that nearby property owners have expressed themselves
as favoring the proposed erection and that none
objects, weighs against the reasonableness of the
decision to refuse the permit.''
Brahan v. Meridian Home Telephone Co., 97 Miss.
325, 6'2 Southern 485, 486, was a suit for damages for
destruction of trees brought against the telephone company. The defendant obtained a directed verdict which
was reversed and remanded for new trial on appeal.
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'':The ownership of trees between the sidewalk and the street is as sacred as any other property right. Of course, the paramount purpose of
sidewalks and the streets is for a public use as
such, and when trees obstruct the free use of the
street the city undoubtedly has the power to carry
out the paramount purpose, and to remove or
destroy the trees, if such action be necessary to
·complete its use to the public; but this power
belongs alone to the city, and can he exercised
only when it seeks to make the street or sidewalk
useful for its legitimate purposes.''
City of Mt. Carmel v. Shaw~ 52 Ill. App. 429, 435,
436, likewise invo~lved shade trees. The city council passed an ordinance narrowing the width of streets by donating two feet on each side to the property owners and
by establishing sidewalk space for six feet adjoining that
two feet, requiring removal of trees in the sidewalk area.
The appellees brought suit to enjoin destruction of valuable shade trees alleging that there was sufficient room
in the street area to build sidewalks without damage to
the trees and that destroying them would result in irreparable damages to the lot owners as weU as the public.
A writ of injunction was issued which was sustained on
.appeal with one modification. The court said:
''Shade trees standing just within the curbing of a sidev•1alk in a street do not constitute a
nuisance, and the city may be enjoined from destroying then1.
'' 'Vhile the decree of the court enjoining the
city from destroying the trees will he affirrned,
it will have
to be modified. The injunction is per,
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petual. Conditions may so change, that in time
public interest may require that the sidewalk
should be mueh wider than six feet; should this
property hy the growth of the city become a business part, then a sidewalk might be required of
twelve feet in width. In such case, the trees would
be an obstruction to trave'l, and the city would
have a rig·ht to remove them when they became
so.''
Sproul v. Stockton, 73 N. J. L. 158, 160, 62 Atl. 275,
is a similar case involving shade trees.
In City of Yale v. Davenport (Okl. 1936), 54 P. 2d,
335, the court held void an ordinance requiring a permit
to move a house across or along a street upon plaintiff's
suit to have the ordinance declared invalid. The ordinance had some provisions reasonably related to safety
and convenience and regulation of traffic and had other
provisions not so related, including one that no house
could be moved unless specia:l assessments on the property had been paid. The court said :
''Under certain provisions of this ordinance,
the court was justified in finding that its adopted regulation had nothing to do with protection
of the streets or their use.''
In Bueneman v. Santa Barbara, 8 Cal. 2d 405, 65
P. 2d 884, 109 A. L. R. 89.5, it was held that a license tax
on laundries making distributions in the city but not having plants in the city was arbitrary, discriminatory, and
void as against a laundry which distributed in the city
and had its plant located outside the city.
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In Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 35, at
p;ages 45, 46, 47, 52, 53, 151 Pac. 558, the court passed
on the right of a private citizen to enjoin as constituting
a public nuisance the continued use of a bank front which
protruded onto the sidewalk and was a portion of the
public street. The court held it had ample authority to
enjoin the continued use of this bank front, but felt constrained to consider the need of the public and balance
that against private interests in determining whether
the bank front should be allowed to remain. The court
thus indicated its views on the factors determining whether the encroachment should remain, indicating that
reasonable encroachments are to be permitted.
''There is nothing in any of the cases, therefore, which necessarily requires the removal of
the front of defendant's bank building under the
undisputed facts and circumstances of the case at
bar, although it be conceded that projecting the
front into the street constitutes a public nuisance
which the courts have full power to abate, and it
be further conceded that the plain tiff's property
is substantially damaged by the pillar next to the
show window in his store building. The reai question to ·be determined, therefore, is whether in this
case a court of equity should exercise its full
power in requiring the removal of the nuisance
********
''Here we have a case where the street is of
the generous width of 132 feet from lot line to
lot line, twenty feet of which on either side is
devoted to a concrete sidewalk for pedestrians.
The public, therefore, in the nature of things,
cannot be inconvenienced to any great extent by
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an obstructed passageway********.
~':Further, the evidence is to the effect that
the front of the building as now constructed is an
ornament to any city, and to now tear down and
remodel it will entail an expenditure of at least
$15,000, and, as we have seen, the architect says
that even then the building will not answer the
purposes for which it was planned and designed********.
"If, therefore, a tenant, or the owner, for
that matter, in the second story of an adjoining
building, wants to look down upon the street or
side,valk, his view will be interfered with and obstructed by plaintiff's projecting awning. This,
however, is not such an impairment of the usefulness of a building as the law can recognize.
If such were the case, .all awnings, signs, and
other obstructions would have to he removed. No
appreciable or substantial damage can result
from the mere projection of defendant's cornice
into the street********.
'• The Legislature, and, when du'ly authorized
by the Legislature, cities and towns may to some
extent, at least, authorize encroachment on public
streets; but they may do that only to a reasonable extent, and then only subject to the right of
any aggrieved person to sue and recover such
damages as he may sustain by the encroachment.''
The Supreme Court indicated res'pect for the same·
considerations in Salt Lake ·City v. Schubach, 108 Utah
266, 159 P. 2d 149. That case was a suit for damages
brought by a woman who tripped over a trap door in a
sidewalk of Salt Lake City and the appeal involved determination of who was responsible for the defect. On
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pages 272-3 of 108 Utah, the court noted that abutting
owners do not have an absolute right to make openings
in the sidewalk for their con¥enience ; but the court said:
''The legislature may, however, authorize
such limited use of the sidewalks for the more
convenient and beneficial use of the adjacent property. ('Citing cases). Such s·pecial privileges or
rights are justified as in the public interest by
increasing business facilities, improving and
making practicable better buildings and improvements on the property and adding to the taxable
value. (Citing cases). The legislative power to
permit such use of the sidewalks has been delegated to the municipalities. This follows from the
grant to the cities of control over the streets and
sidewalks." Sees. 15-8-23 and 15-8-11, U. C. A.
1943.
The Schubach case stated the following limitation
on authority of the cities to permit use of sidewalks by
private individuals :
''It seems to us that the Cohn case and those
following it, what we shall call the IllinoiR line of
cases, overlook one fundamental essential to a
sound rule of liability in this situation, namely:
The fact that the sidewalks are part of the public
highway, dedicated to use by the public, and the
municipal corporations have no right or authority
to grant individuals the use thereof which would
in any way interfere with the use by the public.
(Brough v. Ute Stampede Ass'n., 105 Utah 446,
142 P. 2d 670). However, a properly constructed
coal hole, grating, or vault light, kept in good re-
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pair, does not interfere with such use in any way,
so that the municipal corp·oration may grant abutting landowners the right to make such use of the
sidewalk; but only, however, on condition that
the owner of the abutting property properly construct the grate, coal hole, or vault light, and that
he maintain such structure in such condition that
the public may safely use the sidewalks thereover.''
The subject is discussed generally by McQuillin,
~funicipal Corporations, 2d Ed., in Sections 986, 1438,
and 1453, as follows :
''BILLBOARDS AND STR.UCTURES FOR
ADVERTISING. To promote the public safety,
convenience, comfort, morals and welfare of the
inhabitants, the police power, to regulate the use
of streets and public ways, confers ample authority to enact and enforce, by ordinance, reasonable
and nondiscriminatory regulations, general and
uniform in their nature, respecting the erection
and maintenance of billboards and other structures used for advertising purposes and placed at
or near the street lines. Such regulations are salutary and necessary, are not in restraint of trade,
nor unlawful restrictions upon the legal and beneficial use of property. 'The general welfare clause,
it has been held, will support necessary, reasonable and uniform regUlations. But aesthetic consideration alone, it is generally held, will not
sanction unreasonable restrictions relating to the
erection and maintenance of such structures."
(Section 986).
''Another point to be considered is whether
the encroachment is on the surface of the street
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or is above or below the surface. Much greater
latitude is generally conferred on the municipality
in regard to encroachment above or below the surface of the street, and the reason is clearly apparent, since ordinarily, minor encroachments above
the surface such as bay windows, awnings, and
the 'like, or below the surface, do not in any way
obstruct the use of the street and sidewalk for
travel' or interfere therewith.
''The general rule is that a municipality may
require the removal of an obstruction on a street
notwithstanding there is still ample room left for
passage of teams and travelers. On the contrary,
it is held in some cases that the mere partial obstruction of a street, when as a rna tter of fact
such obstruction does not interfere with the public
use, is not a nuisance." (Section 1438).
''On the theory that the use of the street is
for public and not private use·, strictly speaking
it would seem that, unless expressiy authorized,
an abutting owner has no absolute right to put
up awnings or signs projecting over the sidewalk
or to build bay or oriel windows -extending into
the street or to attach anything to his building
which projects beyond the street line, and such
projections are sometimes expressly forbidden by
city ordinance. Such ordinances are clearly valid.
On the other hand, an awning erected over the
sidewalk is not necessarily a public nuisance per
se. Such structures are so common as to he almost
universal, and, unless prohibited by ordinance,
they are a'lmost invariably permitted unless, as
an actual matter of fact, they become dangerous
or annoying to pedestrians. However, it has
been held that certain kinds, at least, Inay be prohibited in the exercise of municipal police power,
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lated and a permit required, although not as a
matter of fact dangerous or annoying to pedestrians or others.'' (Section 1453).
See, also, State v. Higgs (1900), 126 N.C. 1014, 1023,
1024, 1025, 35 S. E. ±73, (ordinance held invalid which
prohibited hanging signs without regard to danger; overruled in part by Small v. Edington, 146 N. C. 527, 60
S. E. ±13) ; People ex rel Wineburgh Advertising Company v. ~Iurphy (1909), 195 N. Y. 126, 129, 130, 131, 132133, 135, 88 N. E. 17, 21 L. R. A. (NS) 735, where an ordinance reh~ting to sky signs was held discriminatory
as unrelated to safety, health, or n1orals; Laura Vincent
Co. v. City of Selma, 43 Cal. App. 473, 11 P. 2d 17, (regulation of a"·nings must have reasonable relation to the
public safety or convenience); Ivins v. Trenton, 68 N. J.
L. 501, 502, 503, 504, 53 Atl. 202; State v. Wong Ring,
176 ~Iinn. 151, 222 N. W. 639, which discusses the bases
upon which an ordinance regulating awnings over sidewalks can be upheld; Mallory, Inc., v. City of New Rochelle, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 643, sustaining ordinance prohibiting all signs extending over the sidewalks except for
marquees of theaters, hotels, or public buildings with rationalization of its classification.
It therefore appears that licensees and permittees
who are using the streets or a portion of space over the
streets or sidewalks for a private purpose are not altogether without rights and that ordinances regulating
such uses or prohibiting such uses in part (which is
really a regulation) must be reasonable and based upon
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distinctions and reasons which have substance. There is
no power in municipalities to regulate streets and the
use thereof arbitrarily, capriciously, and un.reasonably.
;Therefore, quite apart from procedural questions involved, and assuming that no formal order is required
it still appears that the action of the Board of Commissioners of respondent is unlawful and arbitrary and
should not be allowed to stand. If the city has a defense
to the charges made by the allegations of the complaint,
it should be required to prove that the allegations are
erroneous.

IV.

SECTION 5720, REVISED ORDINANCES OF,
SALT LAKE CITY, 1944, IS VOID BECAUSE
IT CONTAINS NO STANDARD OR RULE ·TO
GUIDE THE BO·ARD OF COMMISSIO·NERS
OR :THE PUBLIC IN THE MATTER OF REMOVAL OF LICENSED SIGNS.

Under this point of our argument appellants respectfully urge and contend that the power conferred on
respondent by the Utah Legislatur~ requires not only
reasonable exercise but that if the respondent sets up by
ordinance the regulation which will govern use of the
streets and sidewalks then that ordinance must have a
reasonable basis, must indicate how the problem will be
handled by the city and give a criterion or standard
which is usable by reasonable citizens.
The provision in Section 5720 of the ordinances ·establishing as the only criterion that an act shall be ''in
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the best interest of the city'' is so vague and general
as to be useless and does not meet the requirements for
such an ordinance as laid down by the authorities.
On the other hand, Exhibit '' E '' is Section 5731 of
the Salt Lake ·City ordinances and regulates signs above,
over or in the streets and is pursuant to Section 15-7-26,
U. C. ..._:\.., 19-!3. This ordinance is the one which, appellants contend, should have been applied to ap·pellants.
It provides a reasonable standard to guide respondent
and citizens in the removal of signs :
''If any sign be found by the bureau of mechanical inspection to be unsafe or dangerous, the
same shall be forthwith repaired and rendered
safe by the owner thereof or the person maintaining and controiling it;********.''
This is a standard which is understandable and susceptible of good administration. It lets pe-rmittees know
what is required of them.
In 37 Am. Jur., page 778, the gene-ral rule is thu~
stated:
•'In accordance with settled principles that
no American legislative body can constitutionally
and validly delegate to administrative officers an
exercise of discretionary power which is arbitrary, it is established that any n1unicipal ordinance which vests an arbitrary discretion in public administrative officia'ls with reference to the
rights, property, or business of individuals, without prescribing a uniform rule of action, making
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trary choice of the officers without reference to
all persons of the class to which the ordinance
is. intended to be applicable, and without furnishing any definite standard for the control of the
officers, is unconstitutional, void, and beyond the
powers of a municipality.''
In Cicero Lumbe·r Co. v. 'Town of Cicero, 176 Ill.
9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 L. R. A. 676, ·68 Am. St. Rep·. 155,: thte
plaintiff obtained an injunction against town offi~ials' enforcing an ordinance which invalidly gave them uncontro~led discretion to permit other than pleasure vehicles
on those streets from which such vehicles were otherwise
excluded. 'The ordinance excluded traffic other than for
pleasure purposes ''except private wagons conveying
families, or upon special permission of this board." In
holding the ordinance void because not indicating standards upon which permission would be granted, the court
said at page 765 of 51 N. E.:
''In other words, the discretion is lodged with
the board of trustees to permit or not to permit
traffic vehicles to be used upon the boulevards
in question. The ordinance, in so far as it invests
the board of trustees with the discretion here indicated, is unreasonable. It prohibits that which is
in itself, and as a general thing, perfectly lawful,
and leaves the power of permitting or forbidding
the use of traffic teams upon the boulevards to an
unregulated official discretion, when the whole
matter should be regulated by permanent local
provisions operating generally and impartially.''
'State v. Coleman (1921), 133 Atl. 385, 387, 96 Conn.
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190, held an ordinance invalid which prohibited speech
making in the public square ''without first obtaining a
permit from the chief of poiice." On this point the court
held:
~~The

only effective way of protecting the
citizen against the abuse of an unlimited discretion is to declare void any grant of an unlimited
discretion to control the exercise of privileges
"Thich all citizens have a common right to enjoy
on equal terms.''
Rizzo v. Douglas (192'3), 201 N.Y. S. 194, upheld an
ordinance making it unlawful to drive a taxicab without
obtaining a license, pointing out the definite guides that
were laid down to control the official discretion and applicants for licenses, and holding at page 196 that without such guides the ordinance would be void.
In People v. Rathje, 33 Ill. 304, 164 N. E. 696, at
page 698 the court said:
"Unlimited power, to be exercised in accordance with the whim or caprice of public officials,
is inconsistent with our systen1 of government.''
Village of Granville v. Krouse, 228 N. Y. S. 204,
holds a municipal! building code void for failure to establish standards.
City of New Orleans v. Palmisano (1920), 83 Southern 789, 146 La. 518, holds void an ordinance regulating
portable gas tanks on the ground that it vested arbitrary
power in the commission where the ordinance required
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a permit from the commission before pulling a portable
gas tank in the city.
And likewise, in City of New Orleans v. B'odie, 83
Southern 826, 146 La. 550, an ordinance provided that
no taxicab would be allowed on the streets of the city
"w~thout an official permit from the department of public safety." The court heid that such an ordinance was
void since it conferred arbitrary power on the department of public safety ''without some uniform system by
which all in the same class may avail themselves thereof
by complying with the regulations so imposed.'' It was
observed that the city could lawfully prohibit all taxicabs on the streets but that if any were permitted it
must be on a reasonable basis.
In Breinig v. County of Allegheny, 332 Pa. 474, 482,
483, 2 Atl. 2d 842, 848, 849, the plaintiffs had received
a permit to cut the curb for a private driveway to their
place of business, which permit was revoked before the
driveway was finished. The court held that this was too
drastic and that the authorities had not properly conceived the requirement of balancing the needs of the
public and the needs of the plaintiffs, saying:
''But the public authorities have the undoubted right to regulate the manner of the use
of driveways by adopting such rules and regulations, in the interest of public safety, as will
award some measure of access and yet permit
public travell with a minimum of danger. The
rules and regulations must be reasonable, striking a balance between the public and the private
interest. ********
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"We agree vvith the court below that the action of appellants was unreasonable and oppressive. The circumstances did not require an absolute prohibition of drivevvays to appellees' property.''
Livingston v. \V olf, et al., 136 Pa. 519, 20 Am. St.
Rep. 936, 20 .A.tl. 551, 552. This was a suit by a property
owner to enjoin construction of a bay window which
would jut into the street 27¥2 inches in front of the house
of defendant, plaintiff's neighbor. ·The city had an ordinance prohibiting ''any jut or blrlk window projecting
into the street more than 28 inches." The court held that
cities have the right to regulate streets and sidewalks
and encroachn1ents thereon and that the regulation was
reasonable, and as to the extent of the power to regulate
streets and sidewalks the court stated :
"The foot .ways no less than the carriage
ways are under municipal control, and the authorities may determine the extent to which the
walks and pavements may be obstructed by cellar
doors, doorsteps, awnings, projecting windows,
cornices, and the like. This power must he exercised by regulations that are general and uniform; that are reasonable and certain; and that
are in conformity with the constitution and laws.
When so exercised it is binding on a'll the inhabitants of the municipality. These general propositions are supported by many cases********. That
the eourts must judge of the reasonableness of
the action of the municipality, and that such action is not binding, if it is unreasonable, was held
1n Knudler v. Norris town, 100 Pa. St. 368, and
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that its action must be general, bearing equally
upon the citizens, was ruled in Reimer's appeal,
100 Pa. St. 182."
In Ex Parte 'Tomlinson, 54 Okl. Cr. 367, 22 P. 2d
398, 400, an ordinance was held invalid which required
owners of ambulances, before making any trip in the
city, to call the police station and obtain permission to
re~pond to the call, the ordinance proviq.ing that the first
one to call would be authorized to niake the trip. This
was held to be arbitrary, unreasonable,· and discriminatory, the court saying:
''This. court has been extremely liberal in its
interpretation of police power of 1nunicipalities,
but the effect of the ordinance in question is to
carry such regulations to an absurd, unjustifiable,
and unreasonable extreme, and beyond the police
'power of the city. The administration of the ordinance in question is left entire'ly to the radio
dispatcher, and, if that radio dispatcher should
see fit to favor a certain funeral home, whether
for profit, friendship, or because of malice toward
others, it would be easy for him to do so. It matters not how· urgent the emergency call, under
the terms of this ordinance the owner of the ambulance cannot answer without being subjected
to a fine, unless he first secured permission of
the radio dispatcher to make the call.''
''Under the police power of the city it has
the right to regulate the use of its streets in a
reasonable manner by prohibiting reckless driving, establishing stop lines, and prohibiting undue noises and other things of like character, but
the city may not in the exercise of its po'lice power
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

49

place arbitrary, unreasonable, and discriminatory
reg·ulations upon any business.''
People ex rel. Schimpff v. Norvell, et al., 368 Iil.
325, 13 N·. E. 2d 960, 961, was a writ of mandamus to
con1pel issuance of a building permit under an ordinance forbidding buildings except where its p,rincip·al
frontage "\vas ''upon a street or officially ap;proved
place,'' as required by the ordinance. The court held
this ordinance invalid as conferring unlimited discretion:
''Any ordinance which invests arbitrary power in a public official which may be used in the
interests of some to the exclusion of others is
unreasonable and void. Cicero Lumber Co. v.
Town of Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 51 N. E. 758, 42 L. R.
A. 696, 68 Am. St. Rep. 155; City of Chicago v.
Trotter, 136 Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359. The ordinance
before us prescribes no conditions or terms upon
which the commissioner of buildings is to· determine what shall be an ''officially approved
place.'' In this respect his action is neither controlled, limited, nor guided by any rules, definitions, or requirements in the ordinance. So far as
that enactment is concerned, he is I eft free to approve a private way proposed by one citizen while
disapproving a similar one for someone else."
Annotations at 12 A. L. R. 1435 and 54 A. L. R.
1104 point out that statutes or ordinances cannot vest
discretion in a public official or body without establishing standards to guide them and the public. The·se annotations note an exception where mere privileges are inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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volved in such prohibitable businesses as selling liquor,
operating pool rooms or public dance halls. In this type
of case the discretion may be more broad than in other
types of cases. These annotations also point out a distinction where immediate action wrll be required and
where the circumstances which may be controlling are
too numerous and too difficult to classify. :The annotator
refers to Eureka ·City v. Wilson, 15 Utah 53, 48 Pac. 41,
aflfirmed 173 (U. S. 32, 43 L. Ed. 603, 19 ·S. 'Ct. 317, as
such a case. That case holds that a city may prohibit the
moving of houses on streets of the city and also that
it may 'prohibit such acts conditionally and confer on a
municipal official the power to dete-rmine whether a
permit shall be gran ted in a particular case. This court
held that such use of the streets is extraordinary and
permissive and that no standards need be set up as it
will be assumed that the discretion will not be abused.
·This case is an exception to the general rule and
makes plain the .position of appellants and their right
to complain of this ordinance. It is plain from the number of appellants and from the complaint (Par. 8) that
the city has granted permits for curb signs over a number of years' time, thus indicating that there is nothing
extraordinary about such use. Discretion of the Colnmissioners has been exercised with reference to these permits and, as indicated in City of Portland v. Yates
(sup:ra) and Breinig v. County of Allegheny (supra), the
fact of continued use has given a sort of vested right in
these appellants. Our case is therefore far removed from
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controiled discretion in the Board of Commissioners.
The ordinanee, requiring no standard or rule of conduct other than it be in the "best interest of the city"
and ""'"hich may mean anything or nothing, does not fall
within the exception to the general rule.
The danger of such uncontrolled authorjty with no
directions or standards to guide either the Commissioners or the public is plain from the facts of this case. In
and upon the streets of Salt Lake City there are innumerable signs, marquees, trees, utility poles, signs on
trucks, signs on buses, advertisements "from sound
trucks, advertising clocks, and a theatre sign across the
street, elevators, delivery chutes, sidewalk basements,
all of '"hich constitute uses for the benefit of abutting
owners (except the signs on buses, trucks, and sound
trucks) and all of which involve use of the street for a
business purpose. In the face of all of these uses, and
without effort to classify such us_es or the reason for
dicriminating against curb signs of these appellants,
Section 5720 would permit the Commissioners to revoke
the permits of appellants when they find it to be in the
city's best interest without indicating why it is so or
against what the signs of appellants offend where all of
the ·multifarious uses referred to do not offend.
Perhaps some signs should be removed as being
unsafe, unattractive, offensive to adjoining property
owners, or as be~ng generaily run down. Any reasonable rules of the city with reference thereto could be
applied hy appellants and could be adhered ~o by the
city. But under the present ordinance the Board of
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Commissioners for a number of years permits erection
of these signs in a manner which is presumably carrying out the best jnterests of the city and then, without
rhyme nor reason ascertainable to appellants, decides
that the best interest of the city has become different
and now requires removal of the signs. Such uncontrolled
power should not be permitted.
CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in sustaining the general demurrer and respondent should be required to disprove
the a'llegations of the com·plaint or else take lawful measures by ordinance to regulate use of the streets for advertising.
The threatened action of respondent is at best premature. Exhibit "D" contemplates amendment of Section 5720 of the Ordinances before curb signs shall be
removed thereunder. And should the court hold that
respondent intended removal of the signs under Section 5720 without amendment then it should follow that
there has been no finding or determination that the best
interest of the city will be subserved by removal of appellants' signs. And in any event, respondent has acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, and has discriminated against
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missioners and is therefore void for want of standards
or guides. The case should be remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
RIC:HARDS AND BIRD
Attorneys for Appellatnt,s.
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